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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of cable television in the 1950's, utilities have
commonly permitted cable television operators to set up cable distri-
bution systems by attaching their cables and equipment to the utili-
ties' pole systems.' Use of the preexisting pole networks is the most
feasible way of establishing a cable system due to financial, aesthetic
and franchise considerations.' The arrangements between the utilities
and the cable companies are referred to as pole attachment agree-
ments and typically involve the leasing of a portion of the unused
space on the pole for an annual fee. These agreements also entitle
the utilities to reimbursement for all costs incident to preparing the
pole for the attachment of cable equipment.' Florida Power Corp.
(Florida Power) entered into such agreements with Cox Cablevision
Corp. (Cox), Teleprompter Corp. and Teleprompter Southeast (Tele-
prompter), and Acton CATV, Inc. (Acton).4
As the cable television industry expanded, the cable companies
became dissatisfied with their contracts with the telephone and elec-
tric power utilities. The cable operators complained that the utilities
often determined rates arbitrarily and drafted terms and conditions
into the contract on a "take it or leave it" basis. The utilities were
1. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 772 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
1107 (1987).
2. Id. at 1540.
3. Id. at 1539.
4. Id. at 1539-40.
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able to dictate the terms of the agreement by virtue of their superior
bargaining position resulting from their monopoly on the ownership
and control of the poles. At the urging of the cable television indus-
try, Congress passed the Pole Attachments Act.5 "The Act autho-
rizes the FCC, subject to preemption by state regulation, to 'regulate
the rates, terms, and conditions of pole attachment agreements and to
ensure that all of such are just and reasonable.' "6 The Act sets a
formula by which the FCC is to determine the range of what would
constitute a "just and reasonable" rate for each particular pole attach-
ment agreement.7 The Pole Attachments Act also empowers the FCC
to "adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve
complaints concerning such rates, terms and conditions."8
Teleprompter and Acton filed complaints with the FCC alleging
that Florida Power was overcharging them under their existing pole
attachment agreements. 9 Florida Power responded that relief would
effect a taking of private property without just compensation, and
thus would violate the fifth amendment."1 The FCC found for Tele-
prompter and Acton and ordered rentals to be set at $1.79 per pole."
Florida Power then filed an application for review by the FCC.12
While this application was pending, Cox filed a complaint against
5. Id. at 1540; see 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982).
6. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1540. The Pole Attachments Act provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the Commission shall
regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that
such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable, and shall adopt
procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve complaints concerning
such rates, terms, and conditions.
47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1). The court found this provision unconstitutional. Florida
Power, 772 F.2d at 1546.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1); see supra note 6.
9. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1540-41. Florida Power was charging Teleprompter an
annual rental rate of $6.24 per pole. The parties had agreed to this rate in a contract dated
July 1977. That contract further provided for rates of $6.51 for 1981, and $6.79 for 1982.
Acton was paying an annual rental rate of $7.15 per pole pursuant to two contracts that the
parties signed in 1980. Id. at 1541.
In its complaint, Teleprompter requested the FCC to order a maximum annual rate of
$2.23 per pole, to insert that rate into the contract, and to require Florida Power to refund to
Teleprompter all monies paid in excess of that rate, with interest, from the date of filing of the
complaint. Acton's request was identical, except that it requested the FCC to order a
maximum annual rate of $2.21. Id.
10. Id. In regard to Teleprompter's complaint, Florida Power argued that the lower rate
would violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment because it would retroactively
nullify a contract predating the effective date of the Act. Id. at 1541. The Eleventh Circuit did
not reach this specific contention because it found that the Act as a whole violated the takings
clause. Id. at 1546 n.6.
11. Id. at 1541.
12. Id.
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Florida Power. 3 Again, the FCC found in favor of the cable com-
pany and granted Cox's request that the FCC set a rate of $1.79 per
pole.14 Florida Power filed an application for review of the Cox order
with the FCC. 5 On September 28, 1984 the FCC, in one order,
denied both applications for review.1 6 Subsequently, Florida Power
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review on
October 5, 1984.17 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the FCC order and
held that the order authorizing cable operators to occupy space on
Florida Power poles effected a taking of property for which just com-
pensation was due," because the court assumed that the FCC would
prevent Florida Power from excluding cable operators from its poles.
The Eleventh Circuit also deemed the Pole Attachment Act unconsti-
tutional insofar as it did not permit a judicial determination of just
compensation. '9 The FCC appealed the Eleventh Circuit's decision to
the Supreme Court.20  The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held, that the Pole Attachments
Act, as interpreted by the FCC, did not effect a taking under tradi-
tional fifth amendment analysis.21 The Supreme Court did not address
the Eleventh Circuit's determination that the Act unconstitutionally
usurped judicial power to assess just compensation, because no taking
had been found.2 2
This Note will examine the forces and policies that have shaped
13. Id. Cox's initial agreement with Florida Power dated back to 1963 and provided an
annual rental rate of $5.50 per pole. In 1978, Florida Power proposed a rate of $6.86. Because
the parties were unable to reach an agreement, Cox continued to pay only $5.50.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1542.
16. Id. The FCC rejected Florida Power's constitutional arguments under the takings and
due process clauses and, in general language, upheld all of the agency's decisions regarding
rate regulation.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1546-47.
19. Id. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted section (d) of the Pole Attachments Act as
prescribing a binding rule for the final ascertainment of just compensation. It viewed this
provision as a legislative usurpation of what has long been held to be an exclusively judicial
function. Id. at 1546. The court cited Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States for the
proposition that "the determination of just compensation under the fifth amendment is
exclusively a judicial function" and that it "does not rest with Congress to say what
compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of compensation." 148 U.S. 312,
327 (1893). The court also cited Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812 (Ct. Cl. 1980), and
American Hawaiian Steamship Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 378 (Ct. Cl. 1954), as
examples of cases where the courts have struck down legislatively imposed standards for just
compensation. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Pole Attachments Act was
unconstitutional because it did not allow for judicial determination of just compensation.
20. FCC v. Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987).
21. Id. at 1113.
22. Id.
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the jurisprudence of the fifth amendment takings clause. Second, it
will analyze and question the reasoning by which the Eleventh Circuit
found a taking through the application of the Loretto per se rule.
Third, this Note will argue that although the Supreme Court cor-
rectly reversed the Eleventh Circuit, the Court's cursory analysis
leaves a most troublesome issue unresolved: whether a property
owner who voluntarily participates in a regulated activity may legiti-
mately invoke the takings clause through the Loretto rule solely to
avoid the economic regulatory burdens of the activity while retaining
its benefits.
II. REGULATION OR TAKING: A FINE LINE
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides in part, that
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."2 The archetypical "taking" occurs when a govern-
ment entity formally condemns a landowner's property and obtains a
fee simple pursuant to its sovereign power of eminent domain.24 The
government then must indemnify the individual for the government
act which, in effect, has redistributed the landowner's property rights
to others.25 Frequently, the indemnification principles of the fifth
amendment conflict with the federal or state exercise of police
power.26
Through their police power, federal and state governments may
infringe upon property rights of individuals if necessary to further the
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897). The constitutions of all states except North Carolina contain similar explicit "takings
clauses." Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1463 n.3 (1978). The framers included this
provision in the fifth amendment to bar the government from placing the full expense of public
projects on certain private individuals because fairness and justice dictate that the public itself
bear this burden. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For a detailed history
of the takings clause, see Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
24. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981).
Constitutional protection of property developed at a time when the principal type of property
right recognized was that of physical occupation and possession. In this context,
constitutional protection of property generally extended only to its title and possession until
around 1877. As a result, government action affecting property was not considered a taking
unless the government action amounted to an acquisition of the fee simple or an ouster of
possession. See Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era. Lessons from the Controversy Over
Railroad and Utility Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 211 (1984); see also Costonis,
Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Modelfor the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
465, 465-576 (1983) (During the nineteenth century, courts were concerned with property as a
physical thing; not as a relationship between an owner and a resource.).
25. Costonis, supra note 24, at 478.
26. Id.
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"health, safety, morals, or general welfare" 27 of the public. When the
government exercises its police power, it need not compensate injured
individuals.28 These intrusions do not vest the government with a fee
simple, but rather, are in the nature of regulations. Although at first
glance regulations may appear less intrusive than outright appropria-
tion of legal title, their effect may be so intrusive or restrictive as to
amount to the same thing. The Supreme Court has desperately tried
to fashion a comprehensive approach for determining when an other-
wise valid state exercise of its police power is so deleterious to an
individual's property interest as to effect a taking, and thus, to entitle
that individual to just compensation.29 The Court has used two lines
of analysis to resolve the takings issue. The first line of cases consid-
ers the use of the police power to interfere with an individual's rights
to control, 30 and make free economic use31 of his property. The other
line of cases involves the state's exercise of the police power to regu-
27. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (Zoning
ordinance excluding buildings devoted to business and trade is legitimate on ground that it
bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community.); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921) (Proper use of the police power may modify tangible rights and, to that extent,
rights can be cut down without pay.). One may trace the definition of "police power" to Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877) (The government may regulate the conduct of its citizens
one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such
regulation is necessary for the public good.). For a description of the scope of the police
power, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("An attempt to define. [the police
power's] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.");
Hadacheck v. C.E. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (defining police power as one of the
most essential powers of the government, permissible as long as its use is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory).
28. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S.
Mar. 19, 1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. See, e.g., Furman, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment-A Clarification of the
Analysis for Takings-Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 28 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1137, 1145 (1984). See generally Costonis, supra note 24; Dunhan, Griggs v. Allegheny
County In Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.
63; Michelman, supra note 23; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); see
also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
30. Costonis, supra note 24, at 477, 513. In his article, Professor Costonis distinguishes
between a dominion interest and an economic interest in property. He claims that historically,
there has always been a bias to extend greater protection to possessory interests in property.
He points out that Justice Holmes made this distinction in Block v. Hirsch. Id. at 514
(quoting 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) ("Tangible property ... tends to give a rigidity to our
conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely clothed.")).
31. Restrictions on economic rights to property have appeared in various forms. See
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (orders totally prohibiting the beneficial use-growing
red cedars trees-to which a landowner had previously devoted land); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinances restricting the most beneficial use of
property); Hadacheck v. C.E. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (nuisance law). Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1889) (nuisance law). For a detailed discussion of restrictions on
economic rights to property, see infra notes 33-49, 64-93 and accompanying text.
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late prices and rates of business commodities.32
A. Property Regulation
Prior to the decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York,3 3 the Supreme Court had enunciated several different tests
for determining whether a regulation effected a taking. These tests
included the "physical invasion" or "appropriation" test,34 the "nui-
sance" test,35 and the "severity of economic impact" test.36  The
32. See infra notes 64-93 and accompanying text.
33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. The Court presented the first test to determine whether an exercise of police power
effected a taking in Pumpelly v. Greenbay, 80 U.S. 166 (1871). In Pumpelly, the state
authorized the building of a dam that caused Lake Winnebago to permanently overflow onto
parts of Pumpelly's land. Id. at 167. The Court held that when anything actually physically
invades real estate, whether the invading material is water, earth, sand, or an artificial structure
placed on it, if it effectually destroys or impairs the usefulness of the property, then it is a
taking. Id. at 181. This decision by the Court established the "physical invasion" or
"appropriation" test in the taking analysis. See Furman, supra note 29, at 1145. The physical
invasion test, however, has received wide criticism. See Michelman, supra note 23, at 1227 (As
a rule for a takings analysis, the physical invasion test's "capacity to distinguish, even crudely,
between significant and insignificant losses is too puny to be taken seriously."); Sax, supra note
29, at 48 (contending that the physical invasion test is an exercise in form over substance and
recommending that it "be rejected once and for all"); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he extent
to which the government may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not
it has authorized a 'physical contact' . . . ."). Despite these criticisms, the courts have
consistently used this test in their takings analysis. See Michelman, supra note 23, at 1184
("The modern significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover."); see
also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904) (telegraph lines that
run over a railroad right-of-way held to be a compensable taking); St. Louis v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (telegraph company had to pay compensation in the nature of rent
for placing its poles in city streets).
The test rests primarily on the notion that a physical invasion destroys the rights to
"possess, use and dispose" of property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982) (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-
78 (1945)); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (A physical invasion by the
government does not simply take a single "strand" from the "bundle" of property rights; it
chops through the bundle, taking a slice out of every strand.). Courts consider the right to
exclude others from private property as one of the most crucial rights, if not, the most crucial
right, that arises from the ownership of property. If the government takes this particular
property right away, be it by a physically compelled occupation or less intrusive actions, a
court generally will find that a taking has occurred. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that deprivation of the right to exclude vessels from a marina
amounted to a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946) (holding that
inability to exclude overhead flights by government aircrafts amounted to a taking).
35. In Mugler v. Kansas, the Court established the "nuisance test." 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
This test does not deal with the physical invasion of or interference with an individual's
physical dominion of his property. Instead, this test is concerned with government action that
interferes with and/or restricts an individual's economic use of his property. In Mugler, the
Court held that prohibiting a property use that may harm the general public welfare is a lawful
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Court sometimes used these tests independently of one another, and
exercise of police power, and the state need not compensate the property owner for any
diminution in value resulting from abating the nuisance. Id. at 669.
The nuisance test is simple to apply. If the government exercises the police power to
restrain or punish crime, or to preserve public peace, health, morals, or safety, then the
exercise of the power is valid and it does not amount to a taking. Id. at 664-69. A court will
deem the government to have effected a taking only upon an invalid exercise of the police
power, that is, an exercise that has no real or substantial relation to proper legislative ends.
See Stoebuck, Police Power Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062
(1980) (arguing that the "nuisance test" under Mugler is really a substantive due process test).
The nuisance test has played a major role in upholding nuisance and zoning laws against
fifth amendment challenges. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding the
validity of an ordinance ordering the total destruction of property on grounds that the
legislative objectives were proper); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926) (upholding ordinance on its face as a measure reasonably calculated to promote the
safety and health of the city); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (ordinance
banning brickyard operation, which posed a health hazard, was not a taking although
brickyard owner suffered a 90% loss of his property); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624
(1887) (upholding a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a
legitimate exercise of the police power in protecting public health, safety, and morals).
Professor Freund has characterized the "nuisance test" as follows:
If the government is trying to prevent a harm, then its action is under the police
power and does not require compensation. If on the other hand, the government
is trying to attain a benefit for the public, then it is acting under its eminent
domain power and compensation is required.
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT § 511 (1904).
The Court significantly eradicated the distinction Professor Freund made in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the Court
held that "harm" could be anything that frustrated articulated legislative policy. The Court
refused to implement Freund's definition of harm, which limited harm to traditional "noxious
uses of land," such as brickyard operations. The Court suggested that decisions restricting
"noxious uses" did not rest on notions of blameworthiness or moral wrongdoing. Id. at 133
n.30. Rather, these decisions would be better understood as restrictions necessary for the
implementation of a legislative policy expected to produce a widespread benefit. Id. Arguably
then, the legislature can restrict an owner's use of his property as long as the action is part of
an implementation of some articulated beneficial social policy.
Recently, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Supreme Court
retreated from the expanded definition of "noxious uses" it had articulated in Penn Central.
55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1987). For a recitation of the facts of this case, see infra note
36. In Keystone, the Court reinstated the narrow definition of "noxious uses" that it had
enunciated in Mugler. The Court specifically defined noxious uses of property as "uses injuri-
ous to the health, morals or safety of the community," "uses inflicting injuries upon the com-
munity," and "uses impending danger." 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331-32. This is precisely the harm/
benefit distinction drawn by Professor Freund.
The Court in Keystone noted that where a state exercises its police power merely to
restrain uses of property that constitute public nuisances, courts, in most instances, will "hesi-
tate to find a taking." Id. at 4332. The rationale for hesitating under these circumstances is
the notion of "reciprocity of advantage." Id. This notion stems from the theory that "while
each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others." Id. That is, as a member of the public, even the
restricted owner benefits from the elimination of the nuisance. The Court concluded that
because the benefits arising from the termination of a nuisance are commensurate with the
resulting burdens, no compensation is due.
The opinion sets out the traditional criteria for determining when a land use regulation
1987] 1155
1156 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1149
other times, concurrently in various combinations. No general agree-
becomes a taking. A land use regulation effects a taking when the regulation "does not sub-
stantially advance a legitimate state interest" or where it "denies an owner economically viable
use of his land." Id. at 4330 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The first
criterion requires a weighing of private and public interest. Id. at 4332. If the regulation
advances a public interest that outweighs the private interest harmed, then the regulation does
not effect a taking. The Keystone decision appears to support the presumption that, in most
instances, the public interest advanced by a regulation falling under "the nuisance exception"
will outweigh any private interest harmed. To buttress its position, the Court cites numerous
opinions where courts have held that compensation is not required when the state acts to stop
illegal activity or to abate a public nuisance although, in so doing, it diminishes or destroys the
value of property. Id. at 4332 n.22.
Unfortunately, although the Court appeared to view the satisfaction of the first criterion
alone as sufficient to preclude the finding of a taking in the nuisance context, it failed to deline-
ate clearly the relevance of the second criterion in the takings calculus. Specifically, the opin-
ion was ambiguous as to whether the two criteria were disjunctive or conjunctive. The opinion
seems to suggest, however, that once a court determines that a regulation falls within the
.,nuisance exception," it should not deem the regulation to be a taking insofar as it actually
restrains noxious uses of property. Arguably, even if a property owner's sole economic use of
his property is a noxious one, a court should not find a taking. This interpretation of Keystone
does not contradict the holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See
infra note 36. Notwithstanding the fact that the Mahon decision stands for the proposition
that a regulation becomes a taking whenever it goes so far as to destroy all property value, the
decision was not made in the context of a "nuisance" type regulation. Accordingly, using
traditional analysis, Justice Holmes in Mahon weighed the public interest advanced by the
regulation against the private interest it harmed. Justice Holmes concluded that the public
interest advanced by the regulation did not warrant the total destruction of private rights, and
consequently, held that the regulation effected a taking.
36. In its decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court took a new approach to
the takings issue. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In both the "physical invasion" test and the
"nuisance" test, the character of the government action was the determinant factor as to
whether a compensable taking had occurred. In Mahon, the Court focused its analysis on the
economic effect of the governmental action. In particular, the Court focused on the diminution
in value of the property resulting from the regulation and the degree to which the regulation
frustrated the owner's investment-backed expectations. Id. at 413.
In Mahon, the Court considered Pennsylvania's Kohler Act which, among other things,
prohibited any mining that might cause the collapse of any structure used as a human
habitation, except in certain circumstances. Id. at 412. The trial court granted an injunction
preventing the coal company from mining a vein of coal running near Mahon's house. Id. at
413. The Supreme Court held that the Kohler Act prevented the coal company from mining,
and in effect, it had made the right to mine worthless. Moreover, the Court's holding stands
for the proposition that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. The Kohler Act was held to to be an
invalid exercise of the police power insofar as it did not advance a sufficient public interest to
warrant so extensive a destruction of the coal company's rights. Id. at 414. This balancing
analysis, involving the public interest underlying a regulation measured against the destruction
of property rights, came to be known as the "diminution of value" test. The major problem
with this test is its application. The Court did not give a workable indication as to how much
of a diminution of value was needed to implicate the takings clause. See Costonis, supra note
24, at 537; Furman, supra note 29, at 1149, 1151 nn.75 & 81; Michelman, supra note 23, at
1192; Stoebuck, supra note 35, at 60.
Subsequent to its decision in Mahon, the Supreme Court veered from the test it had set
forth in that case. In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court declined to use the Mahon test,
despite a substantial diminution in value of the property in question. See Andrus v. Allard,
FCC v. FLORIDA POWER CORP.
ment existed, however, as to the appropriate test for a given set of
facts." This inconsistency ultimately forced the Court to recognize
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not
necessarily equated with a taking."); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96
(1962) (safety measure resulting in the total shut-down of a sand and gravel operation did not
effect a taking despite total diminution of value); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)
(upholding statute that provided for total destruction of a cedar plantation without providing
for just compensation); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
(upholding a zoning ordinance despite a 75% diminution in value).
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court recently revisited
its decision in Mahon. 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1987). The regulation at issue in
Keystone was similar to that in Mahon. In Keystone, Pennsylvania enacted the Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act prohibiting coal mining that causes subsidence
damage to preexisting public buildings, dwellings, or cemeteries. Id. at 4327. Pursuant to the
Act, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources issued regulations requiring,
among other things, that 50% of the coal under designated structures remain in place to
provide surface support. Id. at 4328. The regulations also called for the revocation of mining
permits where removal of coal caused damage to a protected structure and the operator did
not make repairs, or provisions for such repairs, within six months. Id. Relying on Mahon,
Keystone contended that these regulations effected a taking of its property under the fifth
amendment without just compensation. Id. at 4329.
The Court did not find the two determinative factors of the Mahon decision compelling in
Keystone and held that the Subsidence Act did not effect a taking. Id. at 4329. The Court
clarified these two factors as being (1) the nature of the state's action (interest in enacting the
law) and (2) the extent to which the regulation denied the owner the viable economical use of
his land. Id. at 4330.
In the first half of the Keystone opinion, the Court reiterated the important role of the
"nuisance test" in the takings area. The Court could not have been more clear: a state must
be able to restrain property uses tantamount to nuisances without having to pay compensation.
Id. at 4332. If the regulation is. deemed to be an exercise of the police power for the health,
safety, and general welfare, the public interest, in most instances, will outweigh any private
interest involved, and a court will not find a taking. Id.; see supra note 35. The Court
identified the Subsidence Act as falling within the "nuisance exeption" but did not rely solely
on the nuisance characterization to validate the Act. The decision also analyzed the economic
impact of the Act on Keystone.
The Court held that a regulation generally effected a taking under the "diminution of
value" test upon a showing that it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id.
at 4333 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see supra note 36. The opinion
also made clear that, in applying the "diminution of value" test, a court must measure the
degree of interference with property rights as compared with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Id. at 4333 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
Upon review of the economic effect of the Subsidence Act on Keystone, the Court failed to find
a taking. Despite the regulations of the Act, Keystone still could mine profitably 75% of its
underground coal. Id. at 4334. The Court distinguished this situation from that of Mahon in
which the regulation went so far as to render the business of mining unprofitable.
37. "[The Supreme Court], quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government ...." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("There is no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and takings begins."); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (Whether a particular restriction will be found
to be a taking depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."). Not only
has the Supreme Court struggled for a coherent rationale, but it also has been the aim of many
legal scholars "to find a rationalizing principle or set of principles which will 'explain' in the
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that whether governmental action amounted to a taking had been an
ad hoc inquiry involving several significant factors.3" In Penn Cen-
tral,39 the Court gleaned all the factors from the previous tests and
incorporated them into a single multifactor approach. These factors
include the character of the governmental intrusion,4° the economic
impact of the regulation,4' and the extent to which the regulation
interfered with investment-backed expectations.42
In Penn Central, a terminal owner filed suit against New York
City claiming that the application of the Landmarks Preservation
Law constituted a "taking" of property without just compensation
and arbitrarily deprived him of his property without due process.43
The Landmarks Preservation Commission" had denied approval for
Penn Central's plan to construct a fifty-story office building above the
terminal.45 The Court analyzed Penn Central's claim under its mul-
tifactor approach and concluded that no taking had occurred.46 The
sense of imposing an intelligible order upon judicial decisions in compensability cases, or
otherwise to suggest a principle to govern judicial decisions of such cases." Michelman, supra
note 23, at 1171. See Costonis, supra note 24, at 524 (recognizing the need for a coherent
framework that will identify and categorize competing values, preferred values, etc.); Dunhan,
supra note 29, at 63 (describing the judgments of the Supreme Court in the area of
expropriation as a crazy-quilt pattern).
38. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
39. The Penn Central multifactor approach essentially incorporated the "physical
invasion" test of Pumpelly, the "value diminution" test of Mahon, and the "nuisance" test of
Mugler. See supra notes 34-36.
40. See supra notes 34 & 35.
41. See supra note 36.
42. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
43. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 119.
44. The Commission, created pursuant to the New York City Landmark Preservation
Law statute, was responsible for designating sites as "landmarks." Id. at 108-10. Final
designation as a landmark restricted the landowner's possible uses of the property. First, the
law compelled the owner to keep the exterior features of the building in good repair. Second, it
prohibited the owner from altering the exterior architectural features of the landmark or
constructing any exterior improvement on the landmark site without the Commission's
approval in advance. Id. at 111-12. Despite these restrictions on the use of the property, the
law ensured such property owners both a "reasonable return" on their investments and
"maximum latitude" to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the preservation
goals. Id. at 110.
45. Id. at 117-18.
46. Penn Central first claimed that the statute deprived them of any gainful use of their
air" rights. A landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
The Court dismissed this claim on grounds that a denial of the ability to exploit a property
interest that was believed to be available does not always constitute a taking. More
importantly, the Court pointed out that in deciding whether a governmental action effected a
taking, it would measure the interference and character of the action against the rights in the
parcel as a whole. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. Penn Central's second contention was that
the landmark law was arbitrary and discriminatory and thus not a valid exercise of the police
power. The Court disagreed. Id. at 132-35. Lastly, Penn Central argued that the regulation
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Court stressed that, in deciding whether a particular governmental
action effected a taking, a court's focus should be on both the charac-
ter of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole.4 7 A key factor in the decision was that
the statute did not frustrate Penn Central's primary expectation con-
cerning the use of the parcel, but rather, allowed it a "reasonable
return" on its investment.48 The Court also reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the "physical invasion" test as an element of the multifactor
approach by stating that "[a] taking may more readily be found when
the interference with the property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government.
49
Upon application of the Penn Central multifactor approach, it
becomes clear that the test amounts to no more than an ad hoc factual
inquiry by the Court. The Court did not give any indication as to
which factors should be weighed more heavily or which should prove
determinative.5 0 Thus, in the wake of Penn Central, there still existed
great uncertainty in the takings area. The Court had not articulated a
determinative factor that would indicate whether a taking had
occurred. This was the state of the law until the decision in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. 5
In Loretto, the Court modified the Penn Central multifactor
approach by making the "physical invasion" factor determinative on
the takings issue. In Loretto, the dispute arose when New York
significantly diminished the value of the terminal. The Court applied the Mahon test and
measured the economic impact of the regulation on the property. The Court found that the
law permitted Penn Central "not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a
'reasonable rate of return' on its investment." Id. at 136.
47. Id. at 130-31.
48. Id. at 136. The Court determined that the terminal's designation as a landmark
permitted the property owner to continue to use its property precisely as it had been using the
terminal for the previous 65 years.
49. Id. at 124; see supra note 34. But see Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 77 (1980) (upholding a restriction on a shopping center owner's right to exclude students
wishing to circulate a petition on the shopping center's grounds). In its analysis, the Court
found that whether the students had "physically invaded" the shopping center was not
determinative of the takings issue. The Court viewed the physical invasion as limited in nature
because the owner of the property could restrict the time, place, and manner of the activity.
Id. at 83. The Court stressed that such a physical invasion did not "unreasonably impair the
value or use of the property as a shopping center." Id. But cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (owner's inability to exclude others from his marina proved to be the
decisive factor in establishing a taking).
50. The Penn Central multifactor approach involves several factors that courts apply with
varying weights in different cases. The doctrine has left so much uncertainty in its application
to a given problem that commentators have criticized it as permitting a court "to reach
whatever result it wants in any particular case." Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The
Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351, 354-55.
51. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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passed an ordinance5 2 requiring all landlords to permit cable televi-
sion companies to install cable television facilities on their property.
Loretto, a rental property owner, brought a class action on behalf of
all New York owners of real property on which Teleprompter had
placed cable components. She alleged that the installation of the
equipment constituted a physical invasion of private property and,
insofar as the statute authorized such invasions, they effected a taking
under the fifth amendment for which the plaintiffs were entitled to
just compensation.53 The Court agreed and held that a "permanent
physical invasion" authorized by the government is a taking without
regard to the public interest it may serve.54 In its analysis, the Court
distinguished between a permanent physical occupation and a tempo-
rary one, noting that the former necessarily amounted to a taking.55
52. NEW YORK EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) provides in part:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his
property or premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such
reasonable conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning and
appearance of the premises and the convenience and well-being of other
tenants ....
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form... in excess of
any amount which the commission shall, by regulation, determine to be
reasonable.
Id., cited in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
53. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 424. The lower court upheld the statute as constitutional. On
review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the argument that a physical
occupation authorized by the government necessarily effects a taking. The Second Circuit
applied the multifactor approach and concluded that the law served a legitimate police power
purpose, that the regulation did not have an excessive economic impact upon Loretto's
property when measured against her aggregate property rights, and that it did not interfere
with any reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id. at 425.
54. Id. at 426. The Court stated:
[W]e have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property
restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the takings clause.
Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme
form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case,
"the character of the government action" not only is an important factor in
resolving whether the action works a taking but also is determinative.
Id. For a description of the evolution of the physical invasion test, see supra note 34.
55. The dissent noted that the majority made an undefined distinction as to what
contitutes a permanent as opposed to a temporary physical invasion. It found the new
distinction less substantial than the distinction between a physical as opposed to a nonphysical
intrusion. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447-48.
The Loretto Court cited analogous cases to advance its proposition that the invasion was
definitely permanent. Id. at 428-29 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195
U.S. 540 (1904) (construction of telegraph lines over a railroad's right of way constituted a
compensable taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (placement of a
utilty's poles on the city's public streets was a "permanent and exclusive physical
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Because the cable equipment would have to remain on Loretto's prop-
erty as long as she wished to continue to lease the apartments, the
Court viewed the invasion as significant enough to be considered per-
manent.56 The Court distinguished PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins 57 by recognizing that the physical invasion in that case was
temporary and limited in nature.
The underlying rationale for the Loretto decision was the notion
that, to the extent the government occupies physical property, it
occupation")). The Supreme Court concluded that historically courts have treated permanent
occupations of land by utility installations such as telegraph and telephone poles as takings.
The fact that such installations generally occupy only a relatively insubstantial amount of
space and do not interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land has been irrelevant.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.
The Court also noted that certain kinds of servitudes are "constructive permanent
invasions" and, thus, takings. Id. at 433. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979) (The imposition of a navigational servitude destroying the owner's right to exclude
results in an actual physical invasion of the privately-owned marina.); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that frequent low level flights by government aircrafts is a
constructive intrusion upon the landowner's air space).
56. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438. The Court stated: "[A] landlord's ability to rent his property
may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation."
Id. at 439 n.17.
57. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In PruneYard, a group of
students were soliciting in a privately owned shopping center for signatures for petitions in
opposition to a United Nations resolution. Id. at 77. The Court upheld their constitutional
right to free speech and held that distributing the petitions on the shopping center property did
not amount to a taking. Id. at 83. The Court stressed that the owner of the shopping center
could restrict the expressive activity by limiting the time, place, and manner of the petitioner's
activities so as to minimize any interference with its commercial functions. Id. The Loretto
Court characterized the invasion in PruneYard as temporary and limited because the shopping
center owner retained the right to restrict the students' activities. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434.
The Court also found it persuasive that by opening the shopping center to the general public,
the owner had exhibited a desire not to exercise his right to exclude.
It is extremely important to note that the Loretto Court considered the owner's right to
exclude as a decisive factor in determining whether it would characterize an invasion as
permanent or temporary. If the owner's right to exclude is absolutely lost, then the physical
invasion is permanent in nature. If, on the other hand, the owner only loses the right to
exclude temporarily, then the physical invasion is not a permanent one. If the invasion is only
temporary, the court then must subject the restriction to a more complex balancing process to
determine whether it effects a taking. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. The Court's language
seems to indicate that the permanency issue should not be determined by reference to the exact
temporal duration of the invasion. In PruneYard, the Court did not give the students any
deadline as to when they had to stop visiting the shopping center. All the Court required the
students to do was subject themselves to the specific regulations of the shopping center.
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83. The Court seemed to be saying that if the students wanted to visit
the shopping center for the rest of their lives at the regulated times, their occupation would
nevertheless be only temporary. Arguably then, it is the quality of the invasion that determines
whether the occupation is permanent or not, and not the exact temporal duration. As long as
the owner is free to regulate the terms of the occupancy, then the occupancy does not
absolutely destroy his right to use, possess, and dispose of his property. This occupancy then
qualifies as only temporary.
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destroys the owner's rights to "possess, use and dispose of it.""8 In
particular, the Court stressed that the owner loses the power to
exclude others from his property permanently.59 Furthermore, a
physical invasion is qualitatively more severe than any other regula-
tion on the use of property, because the owner may have no control
over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion. 60
Loretto thus established a two tiered analysis to resolve the tak-
ings issue.6 1 A court must first determine whether a permanent physi-
cal occupation has occurred.62 If it has, then the government has
effected a taking. On the other hand, if no permanent physical inva-
sion is found, the court must apply the multifactor approach of Penn
Central.
63
B. Rate and Price Regulation
Rate and price regulation are a vital part of the American eco-
nomic system.64 Federal, state, and local governments regulate prices
58. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945)). For a discussion of the rationale underlying the "physical invasion" test, see
supra note 34. The Loretto Court summarized the destruction of these property rights as
follows. First, the owner has no right to possess the space himself and has no power to exclude
the occupant from possessing or using the space. Second, permanent occupation absolutely
denies the owner any power to use or control the property. The Court noted that although a
deprivation of the right to use property for profit is not in itself sufficient to establish a taking,
it is nevertheless a relevant factor. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 66 (1979)). Third, a physical invasion is qualitatively more severe than a regulatory
invasion insofar as the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the
invasion. Id. at 436.
Professor Costonis has suggested that the Loretto per se rule reflected the Court's
preferential protection of dominion interests as opposed to economic interests. Costonis, supra
note 24, at 513. He contends that the Court's opinion undoubtedly demonstrates that the
Court was more concerned with the statute's exclusion-denying consequences than with its
rate regulation subsection and its limitations on use and disposition. Id. He notes that the
Court did not show any objection to the rent control aspect of the statute prohibiting landlords
from charging their tenants for access to cable television. Id. at 513 n.196. Moreover, the
Court would have found the statute less objectionable had it required landlords, at their own
expense, to provide cable television hook-ups to their tenants. Id. at 513. The Court conceded
that the landlord would be worse off economically under this alternative, but stated that the
state had always had broad power to regulate housing conditions in the landlord-tenant
relationship, without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation
entails. Id. at 513-14 n.197.
59. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
60. Id.; see supra note 57.
61. Furman, supra note 29, at 1157-58.
62. The dissent voiced strong concerns as to the "strained and untenable" distinction that
the majority established between permanent and temporary invasions. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447-
48.
63. Furman, supra note 29, at 1157-58.
64. Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price and Rent Control: The Lesson of Utility
Regulation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 107 (1986).
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for businesses such as utilities, apartment leasing, nursing homes, and
insurance. 65 Prior to 1934, courts restricted price regulation to busi-
nesses affecting the public interest 66 unless emergency conditions
existed.67 Today price regulation is an accepted part of the govern-
ment's normal control over the economy.68
It has been the task of the Supreme Court to set constitutional
limits on the exercise of the government's regulatory power.69 In
65. Id.
66. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In Munn, the Illinois legislature imposed a
schedule of maximum prices on grain warehouses and elevators located in Chicago. The Court
upheld the validity of the legislation against a constitutional challenge.
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest,
he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long
as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.
Id. at 126. The Supreme Court rejected the "clothed with a public interest" doctrine in Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In Nebbia, the Court stated:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other
constitutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.
Id. at 537.
67. Prior to Nebbia, the Supreme Court upheld price regulations against constitutional
challenges under the takings clause as justified by the existence of a state of "temporary
emergency." See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950)
(upholding the validity of the Emergency Price Control Act as a constitutional measure of just
compensation during wartime); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (justifying
regulation by the economic demands of war); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding
rent control in the District of Columbia due to the war emergency).
68. Drobak, supra note 64, at 108. Most modern courts interpret the Supreme Court's
language in Nebbia to mean that the existence of an emergency is no longer a constitutional
prerequisite for price regulation. Drobak, supra note 64, at 107 n.4. For a discussion of
Nebbia, see supra notes 66-67.
69. See Regan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (holding that judicial
inquiry as to the reasonableness and justice of rates so as to prevent confiscation is part of the
judicial function of upholding the constitutional protection of property); Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (holding that the Constitution requires
judicial review of the reasonableness of legislative regulatory rates); cf. Dow v. Beidelman, 125
U.S. 680 (1888) ("[T]he power to regulate is not the power to destroy.").
The judicial scope of review of administrative ratemaking decisions is limited. In
reviewing the reasonableness of a particular rate, the reviewing court should only set aside a
rate where it is "found to be-arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). This standard of review is extremely lenient to
the administrative agency. The principle is that a court should not substitute its judgment or
own inference of fact from that of the agency as long as it finds a rational basis for the agency's
decision. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). This principle does not apply where the
constitutionality of rates, as opposed to their reasonableness, is challenged. In this instance,
the court should exercise an independent determination of the constitutionality of the rates,
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determining the constitutional limits of this power, the takings clause
of the fifth amendment has shaped most of the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis.7" The takings clause serves as a constraint on all types of eco-
nomic regulation by requiring the payment of "just compensation"
whenever a regulation causes sufficient injury to constitute a "tak-
ing."" Two distinct lines of cases have emerged from the Court's
application of the "takings clause" to the government's ratemaking
power.72 Cases dealing with utility rate regulation comprise one line
of cases. The other line of cases deals with federal price controls.
In the utility regulation area, the Supreme Court set the constitu-
tional limits of the government's rate fixing power in Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas.73 In Hope, the Court held that the
constitutionality of rates must be determined through a balancing of
investors and consumer (public) interests. 74  The investors' interest
requires that governmental rates on utilities be "just and reasonable"
in order to be constitutional. 75 A "just and reasonable" rate is one
that allows enough revenue not only for operating expenses, but also
for the capital costs of the business.76 If the governmental rates fail to
satisfy the investors' interest, the countervailing public interest may
nevertheless justify the rates.77 If the court determined that the total
effect of the rate order could not be said to be unjust and unreasona-
ble, then judicial inquiry would be at an end.78
In its opinion, the Court delineated certain factors for determin-
without being limited to the agency's findings of fact. In essence, this is a reiteration of the
principle that legislatures cannot preclude courts from hearing constitutional claims. It
embodies the constitutional protection of checks and balances that the Supreme Court
recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
70. Drobak, supra note 64, at 109. "As both the ratemaking doctrine and the
jurisprudence of the taking clause evolved, the Court recognized that the principles of the
takings clause that constrain government regulation or partial takings are the foundation of the
constitutional ratemaking doctine, rather than the eminent domain principles." Id. at 109
n. 12. According to Professor Drobak, the Supreme Court has ruled over the last hundred
years that utility ratemaking is a governmental taking, which requires just compensation. Id.
at 109.
71. Id. at 109.
72. Id.
73. 320 U.S. 591 (1944); see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575 (1942). The majority in Natural Gas Pipeline held that judicial review of rates
legitimately extends only to the determination of whether the agency order, when "viewed in
its entirety, produce[d] no arbitrary result." 315 U.S. at 586.
74. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
77. Drobak, supra note 64, at 139. For a discussion of the meaning of the public interest in
the ratemaking cases, see Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits
on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U.L. REV. 65, 88-93 (1985).
78. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602.
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ing a "just and reasonable rate."' 79 Most courts interpret this constitu-
tional constraint to require utility rates high enough to maintain
moderate profits for investors.8 0 Utility companies may challenge
rates allowing an insufficient profit margin under the fifth amend-
ment, either under the "just compensation" provision or on substan-
tive due process grounds.81 In sum, in order for rate regulation of
utilities to be constitutional, the rates imposed must satisfy the Hope
standard.82
In the general price regulation area, the Court has not set a con-
stitutional limit on price fixing analogous to the one it established in
Hope.8 3 Instead, the Court has traditionally examined the constitu-
tionality of price controls in light of other factors, different from those
Hope established.84 For example, these factors include the justifica-
tion for the regulation, 5 the duration of the controls, 86 and the ability
79. The Hope Court provided the following guidelines:
From the investor or company point of view, it is important that there be enough
revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital cost of the
business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock.... By
that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with
returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.
Id. at 603 (citation omitted). The judicial scope of review for rates is very limited. A court
will deem a rate to be confiscatory only if unjust, unreasonable or arbitrarily applied. The
focus of the court in conducting the review should be the impact of the rate, not its underlying
rationale. "If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that
result may contain infirmities is not important." Id.
80. Drobak, supra note 64, at 108.
81. Id. at 109.
82. Id. at 109 n. 12. Professor Drobak suggested that courts use the Hope standard as a
measure of just compensation under the fifth amendment. He argued that during the initial
development of the utility ratemaking doctrine after the Civil War, the Court analogized
railroad rate regulation to the eminent domain power. The Court concluded that the
regulation was a taking of the use of the railroad's property which entitled the railroad to just
compensation in the form of reasonable rates. Therefore, the Court has always regarded utility
ratemaking as a "taking" that requires reasonable rates to be constitutional. Courts do not
view Hope as determinative of whether a "taking" has occurred, but rather, as determinative of
whether the "taking," once effected, is constitutional. Utility regulation is constitutional as
long as the government provides just compensation, and compensation is "just" if it satisfies
the Hope requirement. Conversely, courts do not necessarily equate price regulation with an
exercise of the eminent domain power, and thus, do not require the government to satisfy the
Hope standard.
83. Id. at 110; see supra note 82. In order to trigger the Hope standard, the court must
find that a regulation has effected a "taking."
84. Drobak, supra note 64, at 110.
85. See supra notes 66-67.
86. See supra note 67. But cf note 68 (Although the Court has justified the imposition of
price controls as a necessary measure in emergency situations, the Court, in Nebbia v. New
1166 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1149
of the regulated firm to avoid the regulation by withdrawing from the
regulated business."7 The first two factors are often used by the court
in the traditional takings analysis.8" As in the traditional takings
analysis, confiscation of property is the constitutional limit of any
regulation. 89 But because no definite consensus exists as to the extent
of deterioration that is constitutionally permissible, property rights
may be greatly diminished before a taking will be found.90
The ability of a regulated firm to be able to withdraw from the
regulated business has been an important determinant of whether a
court will find that rate or price regulation amounts to a taking.9 It
has been suggested that if a firm is unable to withdraw from the regu-
lated market, either for legal or practical reasons,92 then it is not
unlike a utility, and thus it should be entitled to the Hope constitu-
tional protection.93
III. FCC v. Florida Power Corp.
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Broad Reading of Loretto
In FCC v. Florida Power Corp. , the Court of Appeals for the
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), implied that an emergency was not a prerequisite to their
imposition.).
87. Drobak, supra note 64, at 110. Professor Drobak concluded that utility and price
control cases illustrate that all firms subject to legal price control are entitled to the protection
of the Hope doctrine, even if the firm cannot be classified as a utility. Id. at 123. Drobak
stated: "Legal barriers to exit from a regulated business are a major reason for the
constitutional ratemaking doctrine." Id. at 120.
88. Id. at 110. For a discussion of the traditional takings analysis utilized by the Court,
see supra notes 34-36, 39, 51-63 and accompanying text.
89. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate
Regulation, 65 B.U.L. REV. 65, 98 (1985). Professor Drobak suggested that at some point,
price regulation may result in loss of market value or profits that is so severe as to constitute an
unconstitutional confiscation.
90. Id. at 98-108.
91. Some courts have recently classified the ability to withdraw from a price-controlled
business as a reason for not finding a taking under the utility ratemaking doctrine. See
Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the constitutional utility ratemaking doctrine did not apply to
price regulation of nursing homes, which were free to either go out of business or stop
admitting Medicaid recipients); Worker's Comp. Insurer Rating Ass'n v. State, No. 452,706
(Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 24, 1981) (holding that the Hope standard did not apply to insurance
companies because the companies were free not to write insurance policies).
92. Professor Drobak suggests that a court should determine whether a firm can feasibly
withdraw from a price-controlled business despite the nonexistence of legal barriers. For
example, firms that own many specialized assets could only withdraw from the business at an
inordinate financial loss. Drobak, supra note 64, at 123-24.
93. Id. at 120, 124-25.
94. 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987). For a recitation of the
facts of this case, see supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
FCC v. FLORIDA POWER CORP.
Eleventh Circuit held that the FCC order authorizing cable television
companies to occupy space on Florida Power's poles at rates lower
than those specified in preexisting contracts between the parties
effected a taking of Florida Power's private property.95 Moreover, the
court found the Pole Attachment Act 96 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribed a binding rule for determining just compensation under the
fifth amendment, thus usurping Florida Power's right to a judicial
determination of the compensation issue.97
The Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the per se rule that the
Supreme Court established in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhanttan
CA TV Corp.98 The Loretto rule states that any permanent physical
invasion is a fifth amendment taking, which entitles the property
owner to just compensation.99 In its analysis, the appellate court
viewed the FCC order as requiring Florida Power to permit the cable
companies to occupy its property permanently. 1I By such a charac-
terization, the court implicated the Loretto per se rule. The FCC con-
tended that the facts of this controversy did not warrant the
application of the Loretto rule10 1 and that before a court may apply
the Loretto rule, there must be an uninvited and permanent physical
occupation. 102
The FCC argued that its regulation of Florida Power differed
significantly from the regulation in Loretto.10 3 First, the FCC con-
tended, because Florida Power voluntarily granted access to its
poles, 1" it was not entitled to the protection that the Loretto rule
afforded a landlord from an uninvited intrusion. Second, the FCC
argued that even if the court viewed the cable companies' presence as
uninvited, it was not permanent in nature because the occupation
95. Id. at 1539. The court concluded that on the facts, "Loretto... controls, and based on
that decision, we hold that the FCC's Order effected a taking of Florida Power's property."
Id. at 1544.
96. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982).
97. 772 F.2d at 1546.
98. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), cited in
Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1544; see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
99. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
100. 772 F.2d at 1544.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1542.
104. The FCC contended that Florida Power "knowingly and voluntarily contracted with
the cable companies for the installation of the cable network." Id. at 1543 (emphasis added).
Consequently, the FCC contended that Florida Power could not claim that the cable
companies' access to its poles was "uninvited." Loretto involved such an uninvited access
because the applicable government regulation explicitly granted the cable companies access to
occupy Loretto's property. Loretto neither invited nor agreed to the cable companies'
presence.
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would last only until expiration of the contracts. Permanence, the
FCC argued, is the second prerequisite for invoking the Loretto
rule.1
05
The court, however, rejected the FCC's contentions. As to the
first, the court conceded that although one could construe Florida
Power's actions as an invitation to the cable companies to occupy its
poles, the invitation was subject to and based on certain conditions,
namely, the negotiated annual rate. 106 By insisting on different condi-
tions, the cable companies transformed their status from that of "invi-
tee" to that of "trespasser." 107
The Eleventh Circuit equated Florida Power's situation with that
of the landlord in Loretto, where the regulation forced the landlord
both to rent space to cable operators and to do so for a specified one
time fee. Although the critical coercive aspect of Loretto was clearly
absent from the FCC regulation, 108 the court nonetheless held that the
FCC regulation operated in the same manner as the Loretto regula-
tion and thus effected a taking. 109 In essence, the Eleventh Circuit
found the FCC regulation to be "constructively coercive" by assum-
ing that if Florida Power decided to terminate the occupation of the
cable companies, the FCC would grant a stay preventing Florida
Power from evicting them.110 The court assumed that the FCC would
105. Id. at 1543. The FCC contended that Florida Power had to endure the cable
companies' presence only for the term of the contracts.
106. Id. The court stated, "In our opinion, the cable companies' occupation of Florida
Power's poles at the rate specified by the FCC is anything but invited."
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 122-124.
109. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1544.
110. The FCC felt that issuance of temporary stays would further the intent of Congress in
enacting the Pole Attachments Act because Congress intended to give the FCC power to
protect cable operators from irreparable injury pending resolution of facially supportable
complaints. The Act provided the FCC with broad discretion in promulgating rules to carry
out the Pole Attachments Act. In the. Matter of Adoption of Rules For the Regulation of
Cable Television Pole Attachments, 68 F.C.C.2d 1585 (1978).
Moreover, Section 4(i) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), defining the duties and
powers of the Commission, states that "The Commission (FCC) may perform
any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders ... as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions." The adoption of complaint
procedures is in no way constrained by the Act. To the contrary, the intent of
the pole attachment regulation is that the Commission develop "a flexible
program..." that includes such rules as it "deems appropriate to the conduct of
the complaint procedure."
Id. at 1587.
The FCC may issue temporary stays only in limited circumstances. The FCC will allow a
cable operator to petition for a temporary stay "(1) prior to removal of the CATV facilities
from poles or termination of service or maintenance, etc., and (2) prior to an increase in pole
attachment rates." Id. at 1588. In order to allow the cable operator time to file a petition, the
FCC has required utility companies to give cable operators notice 60 days prior to taking such
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grant the stay whether Florida Power decided to terminate existing
contracts or merely refused to renew them at expiration."' If the
FCC actually prevented Florida Power from evicting the cable com-
panies, then Florida Power could justifiably claim that the regulation
coerced it to provide a third party with access to its property. This
scenario undoubtedly would warrant the application of the Loretto
rule. Yet, significantly, it is only upon the happening of this contin-
gency that the cable companies' occupation of Florida Power's poles
would qualify as the type of occupation triggering the Loretto rule.
Even if the FCC were to issue a temporary stay, the occupation
would have to be permanent in nature before the Loretto rule inhered.
The court found that the occupation was permanent because Florida
Power would have to wait at least until its contracts expired before
excluding the cable companies. 1 2 Even upon expiration, it is plausi-
ble that the FCC would prohibit Florida Power from excluding the
companies at all, and effectively force the companies to renew their
contracts." 3  The court emphasized that the Loretto permanency
requirement does not necessarily demand that the physical occupation
last forever. " 4 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the fact that
the FCC could prevent Florida Power from excluding the cable com-
panies rendered the duration of the invasion indefinite. The court
action. The cable operator must file its petition at least 45 days in advance of the proposed
change. The utility then has seven days to respond. No further filings are permitted unless
requested or authorized by the FCC, nor will extensions of time be granted unless justified by
47 C.F.R. § 1.46 (1986). The FCC had considered granting automatic stays under these cir-
cumstances but rejected that proposal. 68 F.C.C.2d at 1587-88.
The FCC has stated that it will not grant a stay absent a preliminary indication of the
unlawful nature of the complaint and a clear demonstration by the cable operator that it is
likely to suffer irreparable harm and cessation of service. "[The FCC] will adhere to a strict
threshold showing where such a claim is asserted, and [it] will not hesitate to dismiss where
inadequate support is provided." Id. at 1588.
111. In support of its position, the court cited previous cases in which utilities ordered cable
companies to disconnect their equipment and the FCC routinely intervened and issued
temporary stays preventing the exclusions. See Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1543 (citing
Whitney Cablevision v. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., Mimeo 841 (Nov. 16, 1984);
TeleCommunications, Inc. v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., Mimeo 5957 (Aug. 16, 1983)).
At present, it is not clear how the FCC would react should Florida Power attempt to exclude
the cable operators. Presumable, if Florida Power should do so purely to avoid the regulatory
rate ceilings, logic and analogous precedent strongly suggest that the FCC would stay such an
action. See infra notes 138 & 58-59; cf. Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1968).
112. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1544.
113. Id.; see supra notes 111-12.
114. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1544. In Loretto, the Court noted that as long as the
landowner wanted to lease her property, she had to abide by the regulation and grant access to
the cable companies. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439. Arguably, the Court must have believed that
this condition on her right to rent her property would probably force her to acquiesce to the
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concluded that the cable companies' physical occupation satisfied
Loretto's permanency requirement 15 and constituted a compensable
taking. 1
1 6
B. The Supreme Court's Shortsighted Reversal
of the Eleventh Circuit
The validity of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis necessarily de-
pended on the assumption that the FCC would prevent Florida Power
from excluding the cable companies from its poles. 11 7 A facial consti-
tutional challenge to the Pole Attachments Act was not at issue
cable operator's occupation for an amount of time sufficient to satisfy Loretto's permanency
requirement. The Eleventh Circuit analogized the Loretto situation to that of Florida Power.
This analogy, however, is flawed. In Loretto, the government required a landlord to allow
a cable company to physically invade her property until she chose to remove her property from
the rental market. It would have been economically irrational for Loretto to take such an
extreme step to avoid a minimal physical invasion having no real economic impact on her
property. The Court therefore concluded that the cable operator's occupation was permanent
in nature.
Florida Power, on the other hand, may have to endure the cable operators' presence on its
poles only until the expiration of its contracts. This is quite different from the situation of the
landlord in Loretto. The physical occupation of Florida Power's poles is finite in nature and
the utilities need endure the occupation only for the term to which they themselves originally
agreed. If, however, the FCC were to go so far as to prevent Florida Power from excluding the
cable operators at the end of the contract term, then such a stay would amount to a forced
renewal. Although the occurrence of a forced renewal would implicate the concerns embodied
in Loretto, it would be fundamentally incorrect to equate the coerciveness of the government's
actions in the two cases. If the FCC had perceived Florida Power's motive for not renewing its
contracts to be retaliatory, it probably would have prohibited Florida Power from
discontinuing pole attachment rights; but only if Florida Power voluntarily continued to
designate rental space on its poles for other cable operators. The Pole Attachments Act's
legislative history clearly states that a utility company that owns and controls poles is not
subject to FCC jurisdiction if no telecommunication space has been designated on its poles. S.
REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 100, 123-24. Section 1.1406(a) of the Pole Attachments Complaint Procedures
requires the FCC to dismiss a complaint against a utility if the utility does not use or control
poles, ducts, or conduits used or designated, in whole or in part, for wire communication. 47
C.F.R. § 1.1406(a) (1978). Therefore, if Florida Power wanted to exclude cable operators
from its poles, it only need cease designating space for wire communication.
It would be illogical and inaccurate to characterize the FCC stay under these
circumstances as a coercive regulatory action analogous to that of Loretto. The Loretto
regulation was coercive partly because it left the landlord no reasonable alternative method by
which to avoid the physical invasion of the cable operators, but rather, required the landlord to
subject a portion of her property to a physical intrusion. Florida Power cannot legitimately
make this claim. An FCC stay clearly would not coerce Florida Power to subject its property
to the occupation of cable companies. If Florida Power chooses not to rent its pole space to
the cable companies, it may simply remove its pole space from the rental market.
115. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1544.
116. Id.
117. If the FCC did not impede Florida Power's right to exclude cable companies from its
poles, then the Pole Attachments Act does not impose a physical occupation. See infra notes
123-24.
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before the Eleventh Circuit. The real issue decided was, had the FCC
issued a stay, would it have amounted to an unconstitutional taking of
Florida Power's property by virtue of the Loretto rule. The Eleventh
Circuit's decision invalidated the Act as applied to Florida Power on
the assumption that the FCC would grant the cable operators a stay
preventing Florida Power from excluding them. On appeal, therefore,
the Supreme Court should have reviewed the validity of the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis in light of this assumption. The Court, however,
explicitly chose not to address the the Eleventh Circuit's assump-
tion.1 18 Consequently, the Court's decision offered no insight as to the
validity of the appellate court's analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court
chose to analyze the constitutionality of the Pole Attachments Act
only facially, and on that basis alone, reversed the Eleventh Circuit. 119
The Supreme Court found that the Eleventh Circuit had "broad-
ened that narrow holding [of Loretto] beyond the scope to which it
legitimately applie[d]." 2° According to the Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Circuit failed to distinguish between the character of the govern-
ment regulation before the Court in Loretto and that of the FCC
regulation involved in this dispute.121 The government regulation
involved in Florida Power differed radically from that which the
Court invalidated in Loretto. The Loretto Court focused on uninvited
intrusions resulting from government regulations that coerce a prop-
erty owner to subject some portion of his property to a physical occu-
pation by a third party. 12 2 The Pole Attachments Act, on the other
hand, does not vest a CATV system operator with a right of access to
118. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987).
119. Id. at 1111.
120. Id. at 1112.
121. Id. The Court's holding in Loretto rested entirely on the character of the government
regulation involved. See supra notes 54-55, 58 and accompanying text. The Loretto Court
made clear that its holding was very narrow. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. Loretto is to apply only
where the character of the government action is in the form of a permanent physical
occupation, whether the occupant is the government, or an authorized third party. Id. at 432
n.9. The Loretto Court distinguished between a government action that requires a physical
occupation and a government action that seeks only to restrict the use of property. It made
clear that when the government only restricts the use of property, a court should analyze the
government action under the multifactor approach of Penn Central. Id. at 440-41. The Court
then reaffirmed that the government has substantial authority to impose appropriate
restrictions upon use of private property. Id.
122. The Loretto Court noted that "as long as these regulations do not require the landlord
to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his [property] by a third party," the Loretto
rule is inapposite. 458 U.S. at 440. In Loretto, the New York regulation required the property
owner to allow the cable companies access to her property. The regulation specifically
prevented the landlord from interfering with the installation of the cable facilities on her
property. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
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utility poles.123 The FCC is not empowered to authorize cable opera-
tors to physically occupy any of the utilities' property. The FCC's
regulatory power only inheres when a utility voluntarily engages in
the business of renting out pole space and solicits the presence of cable
operators onto its poles. Congress empowered the FCC to exercise
regulatory restraints on private agreements between utilities and
CATV systems when the parties themselves are unable to reach a
mutually satisfactory arrangement 124 so as to prevent monopolistic
strong arm tactics on the part of the utilities.' 25 The Supreme Court
found the FCC regulation to be a restriction 126 on the use of property,
not a government compelled physical occupation. The regulation
merely restricts a utility's economic use of its property.' 27  The dis-
tinction between these two regulatory schemes is obvious. The regu-
123. In the instant case, the FCC regulation did not require Florida Power to provide
access to its poles to the cable companies . To the contrary, the legislative history of the Pole
Attachments Act expressly provides that the Act does not "vest within a CATV system
operator a right to access to a utility pole... [nor does it] require a power company to dedicate
a portion of its pole plant to communication use." S. REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 100, 124 (emphasis added).
124. The legislative history of the Act clearly states that the:
[B]asic design of [the act was] to empower the [FCC] to exercise regulatory
oversight over the arrangements between utilities and CATV systems in any case
where the parties themselves are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory
arrangement. .... The underlying [aim of the act] is to assure that
communications space on utility poles, created as the result of private agreement
between nontelephone companies and telephone companies, or between
nontelephone companies and cable television companies, be made available, at
just and reasonable rates, and under just and reasonable terms and
conditions.... FCC regulation will only occur when a utility or CATV system
invokes its powers ... to hear and resolve complaints relating to the rates, terms,
and conditions for CATV pole attachments. The Commission is not empowered
to prescribe rates, terms, and conditions for CATV pole attachments generally.
S. REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 109, 123.
125. Cable operators complained that utilities were exploiting their monopolistic position
and demanding unreasonable rates. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1540.
Due to the local monopoly in ownership or control of poles to which cable
system operators, out of necessity or business convenience, must attach their
distribution facilities, it is contended that the utilities enjoy a superior bargaining
position over CATV systems in negotiating the rates, terms, and conditions for
pole attachments. It has been alleged by representatives of the cable television
industry that some utilities have abused their superior bargaining position by
demanding exorbitant rental fees and other unfair terms in return for the right to
lease pole space. Cable operators, it is claimed, are compelled to concede to these
demands under duress.
S. REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
109, 121.
126. Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1112.
127. See supra note 124. The FCC regulations prevent the utilities from imposing un-
reasonable rates, terms, or conditions on the cable companies. The FCC became involved in
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lation in Loretto was purely coercive inasmuch as property owners
had no choice but to allow cable companies to occupy their property
at specified compensatory rates. The Florida Power regulation, in
contrast, is conditional in nature. Although rates are subject to a reg-
ulatory maximum, the regulatory "burden" only applies after an
owner affirmatively and voluntarily elects to accept the concomitant
benefit of the occupation. The Supreme Court emphatically stated
that the distinction between the cable companies in Florida Power
and Loretto "is the unambiguous distinction between a commercial
lessee and an interloper with a government license."' 28 It was the
coercive and intrusive nature of the Loretto regulation that led the
Court to hold that the regulation per se effected a taking.
129
C. What the Supreme Court Ought to Have Addressed
The decision of the Supreme Court in FCC v Florida Power Corp.
firmly establishes the Court's intention to apply the Loretto per se rule
in an extremely narrow manner. 3 ' On its face, a regulation will trig-
ger the application of the Loretto rule only when its language unam-
biguously compels a physical occupation of private property, and, like
the regulation in Loretto, leaves the owner no reasonable alternative
by which to avoid the intrusion. Yet, critically, the Supreme Court
failed to address the statute in light of the FCC's power to issue stays
of exclusion. As the appellate court suggested, it was this power alone
that rendered the regulation under the Pole Attachments Act analo-
gous to the coercive regulation in Loretto.1 31 The regulation was
clearly valid on its face. The real issue was whether a regulatory
agency may, through the issuance of a stay, prevent a property owner
from exercising his right to exclude solely to avoid rate regulation
after having elected to benefit from the regulated activity or whether
under such circumstances, the issuance of a stay would constitute a
taking under Loretto. By validating this regulation in a vacuum, the
Court offered a holding of limited import and failed to pass upon the
difficult and pressing problem: may an owner invoke the takings
clause to make an end run around a valid regulatory scheme?
Because the Supreme Court failed to address the propriety of the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis, a property owner still has the option to
the regulation of pole attachment agreements following complaints by cable operators that the
utilities were overcharging them.
128. Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1112.
129. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
130. Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1112.
131. Florida Power, 772 F.2d at 1513-14; see supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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resort to such tactics to flout regulations necessary for the public
welfare.
Florida Power objected to the regulation of rates by the FCC, not
to the presence of the cable companies. Florida Power was aware that
the Pole Attachments Act was in effect when it entered into contracts
with some of the cable operators. 32 Therefore, when Florida Power
entered into contracts with the cable operators, it assumed the risk of
regulation. Florida Power had no right to complain when that risk
materialized. Florida Power sought to avoid regulation while contin-
uing to rent out telecommunication space at a premium.
Because Florida Power based its objections solely on the imposi-
tion of the FCC's prescribed rates, it follows that it would not want to
rent out its space to any other cable company because it would subject
itself again to the risk of regulation at the same rate. 3 3 A decision by
Florida Power to take its rental space out of the telecommunications
market would eliminate the FCC's jurisdiction over the utility
poles.134 If Florida Power's motive for terminating or refusing to
renew pole attachment agreements stemmed from its desire to leave
the rental market, then it would be free to exclude any cable operator
from its poles. The difficult question arose solely because Florida
Power had no intention of foregoing the lucrative rental of otherwise
132. Florida Power entered into the Acton contract two years after the enactment of the
Pole Attachments Act. The contract with Teleprompter was finalized while the Act was under
consideration. The contract with Cox, although initially made prior to the Act, provided for a
term of one year and thereafter was terminable at will by either party on six months notice.
Florida Power was on notice of the Act when it failed to terminate each of these contracts.
Brief for Appellant at 17-18, FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987) (No. 85-
1660).
133. The FCC determines reasonable rates for a utility company based on a formula
prescribed by the Pole Attachments Act.
For purposes of subsection (b) of this section, a rate is just and reasonable if it
assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing
pole attachments, nor more than the additional cost of providing pole
attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the
percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit
capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment, by the sum of the operating
expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole,
duct, conduit, or right-of-way.
47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) (1982). The FCC has interpreted the statute to require the maximum
rate allowed under the Act whenever it reduces an existing pole attachment rate. Florida
Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1113. Therefore, the rates a utility may charge a cable operator will not
vary substantially.
134. The FCC will dismiss any complaint by a cable operator where "the utility does not
use or control poles, ducts, or conduits used in whole or in part, for wire communication." See
supra note 114. The FCC will not dismiss a complaint if there is communications space
designated on the poles and the utility has discontinued cable operator attachments in order to
avoid FCC jurisdiction. As long as the utility does not designate communication space on its
poles, it is free from FCC jurisdiction. 68 F.C.C.2d at 1589.
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useless space. Because Florida Power did not want to remove the
telecommunication space from the rental market, and because it
offered no other motivation for excluding the cable operators, it neces-
sarily follows that Florida Power wanted to exclude the operators
solely so it could seek other cable operators that would be willing to
pay higher rentals than those allowed by the FCC."3 5 As long as these
replacement tenants refrained from complaining to the FCC about
such rentals (as they would to avoid the fate of their predecessors),
the transaction would remain beyond the reach of the FCC's regula-
tory jurisdiction and scrutiny. Through such disingenuous posturing,
Florida Power would have cornered the government and cable com-
panies into a checkmate position. If the FCC allowed Florida Power
to exclude cable companies because the utility objected to the rate
regulation, cable operators would be dissuaded from invoking FCC
jurisdiction. 36 The utility companies could thus coerce the operators
135. Florida Power could do this because the FCC is not empowered to interfere in a pole
attachment agreement unless the cable operator first complains. See supra note 124.
136. The situation between Florida Power and the FCC is analogous to the situation which
other courts have addressed in the landlord/tenant relationship. In that context, courts have
upheld laws restricting a landlord's ability to evict a tenant for retaliatory reasons. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The rationale for this
approach is that unless a tenant is given protection of this sort, he would be hesitant and
fearful of reporting housing code violations to the authorities with the result that the legislative
goals of the code would never materialize. Housing conditions would improve negligibly, if at
all.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent to the summary disposition of Fresh Pond Shopping Center
v. Acheson Callahan, addressed the implications of the Loretto decision in the landlord/tenant
context. 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Fresh Pond, the city of Cambridge
enacted an ordinance preventing landlords from removing their rental units from the market
save at the discretion of a rent control board. Id. at 876. In deciding whether to grant the
removal permit, the Cambridge Rent Control Board was to consider factors such as the
hardship imposed on the tenants of the units sought to be removed, the benefits of denying
removal to the tenants protected by rent control, and the effect of removal on the proclaimed
housing shortage in Cambridge. Id. at 876. The Board was empowered to deny removal
permits under almost any situation. Id. The city of Cambridge also enacted the Cambridge
rent control statute. Id. The rent control statute prohibited landlords from evicting tenants
without first obtaining an eviction permit. A landlord must first obtain a removal permit,
however, before he is permitted to obtain an eviction permit. Id. Eviction permits are only
issued when tenants commit certain improper acts. Id. In conjunction, both regulations
severely restrict a landlord's use of his property.
Justice Rehnquist viewed these restrictions on the landlord's ability to evict tenants as
amounting to a taking of property. "In my view this deprives appellant of the use of its
property in a manner closely analogous to a permanent physical invasion, like that involved in
Loretto." Id. A landlord is only allowed to evict a tenant if he is permitted to take his
property out of the rental market. Even then, it is doubtful whether he would in fact be
allowed to do that.
The situation in Fresh Pond is distinguishable from that in Florida Power. In Fresh Pond,
the regulation not only prevented the landlord from excluding tenants for retaliatory reasons,
but also restricted the landlord in his ability to remove his rental unit from the market
irrespective of motive. According to Justice Rehnquist, the regulation effectively compelled
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into silently submitting to rates above FCC limits. To countenance
such strong arm tactics would deny the public the benefits underlying
the Pole Attachments Act.
137
On the other hand, if the FCC tried to avoid this situation by
granting stays to prevent retaliatory and regulatory evasive evictions
of cable companies,'38 the Loretto rule technically would compel a
court to deem such an action a taking. A court would then have to
invalidate the regulatory scheme or order the FCC to compensate
Florida Power at "market value"' 39 for the taking of its pole space. A
court could easily construe market value to entitle Florida Power to
compensation at the monopolistic rates it had charged prior to the
the landlord to participate in the rental market. Arguably, the facts of Fresh Pond implicate
the price control issue of whether "inability to leave a regulated market" amounts to a taking.
See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is possible that Justice Rehnquist
might not apply the Loretto rule where the restriction on eviction would only be imposed in the
case of retaliation and where the property owner would be free to exit the market otherwise.
137. See infra note 158.
138. The legislative history of the Act shows that the committee recognized instances where
a nontelephone utility that provided cable pole attachment space might discontinue such
provision to a particular cable operator simply in order to avoid FCC regulation. S. REP. No.
580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 109, 124.
The committee believed that under the Act, the FCC could determine that such conduct
would constitute an unjust or unreasonable practice and take appropriate action upon finding
that cable pole attachment rights were discontinued solely to avoid jurisdiction. Id.
Appropriate action under these circumstances would include the issuance of a temporary stay
pending resolution of the charge. The authority of the FCC to issue temporary stays in cases
of retaliatory action has not been questioned in this litigation. Arguably, if the FCC has broad
discretion to implement the policies underlying the Act, granting a stay would constitute a
valid means by which to prevent this unfair practice by the utility companies.
139. The fifth amendment requires the payment of "just compensation," normally
measured by fair market value, whenever the government takes private property for public use.
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1948). Courts have commonly interpreted the
standard of "fair market value" to mean "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller at the time of the taking." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). Fair
market value entitles an owner to be put in as good a pecuniarily position as if the government
had not taken his property. He must be made whole although he is entitled to no more. Olson
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). The Court in Miller stated that "the term fair hardly
added anything to the phrase 'market value', which denotes what 'it fairly may be believed that
a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given, or more concisely, market value fairly
given'." Miller, 317 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).
Although courts have commonly used "fair market value" as the measure of just
compensation, courts have acknowledged situations where market value is inappropriate
because it is either not ascertainable or where its application would result in manifest injustice
to the owner or the public. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,
123 (1950). For example, market value is not readily ascertainable when the property, or the
type of property at issue, has not been sold in the market for a long time. The application of
the "fair market value" would result in injustice to the public "when property has special value
to the owner because of its adaptability to his needs, or where it has a special value to the taker
because of its peculiar fitness for the taker's project." Miller, 317 U.S. at 375; see United States
v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
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existence of the regulatory ceiling. " Again, the cable companies
would be at the mercy of the utility companies. The end result is that
whether or not Florida Power escaped regulation, it would still
receive a premium for its pole space by virtue of its monopolistic
status.
Florida Power is legitimately entitled to avoid FCC regulation if
it withdraws its telecommunication space from the rental market.""
Florida Power does not have to overcome any legal or practical bar-
rier that could prevent it from doing so. Its situation, therefore, is not
analogous to that of the landlord in Loretto. In Loretto, the landlord's
primary economic use of her property, apartment rental, was condi-
tioned on her submission to a government intrusion unrelated to the
primary use. 142 In Florida Power, the regulation conditions a secon-
dary economic use of property, the rental of otherwise superfluous
space, upon submission to a valid economic regulation directly related
to this secondary use alone. The regulation in no way impedes the
primary use of the property-transmission of electricity. Loretto was
not engaged in the business of renting space on her property to cable
operators. The effect of the regulation, however, left Loretto no real
choice: she had to either rent the space or forfeit the primary eco-
nomic use of her property. In contrast, Florida Power had a choice.
It could avoid the FCC regulation while still engaging in the primary
economic use of its its poles-the transmission of electricity.
Because the Supreme Court failed to either condone or condemn
140. See supra note 149. The market value of Florida Power's rental space is readily
ascertainable. Arguably, if the definition of market value is "what a willing seller will pay a
willing buyer," then the rates Florida Power charged the cable companies before the FCC
intervened could be seen as representative of market value. Clearly Florida Power would have
sought compensation in that amount. When the FCC intervened to prevent Florida Power
from continuing to charge monopolistic rates, it determined what would be a "just and
reasonable" rate. See supra text accompanying notes 11 & 14. Arguably, the FCC's formula
attempts to arrive at a "fair" market rate for Florida Power rental space, one corresponding to
competitive market forces. Florida Power's objective in this takings claim must be to obtain
compensation at monopolistic, uncompetitive rates. The Supreme Court, in deciding Florida
Power, noted that one could not seriously argue that the maximum rates prescribed under the
Pole Attachments Act were confiscatory. Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1113; see supra note 69.
Implicit in this holding is that FCC regulation of Florida Power's rental space, under a rate
regulation takings analysis, did not amount to a taking under the fifth amendment.
Perplexingly, if Florida Power is allowed to establish a taking under Loretto, then arguably it
should be entitled to some amount of just compensation in excess of FCC rates. It would be
senseless for the Court to entertain Florida Power's takings claim, if at the end, it would grant
as just compensation the originally-prescribed FCC rates.
141. As far back as Munn v. Illinois, the Court noted that price controls are fair because the
owner of the business can withdraw from the regulated business. The Court also specified,
however, that "so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control." 94 U.S. 113,
126 (1877); see supra note 66.
142. See supra note 56.
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the reasoning that the Eleventh Circuit considered fundamental to its
holding, the appellate decision may well be viable precedent should
the FCC ever actually stay a retaliatory eviction. As the Eleventh
Circuit's decision demonstrates, a court could easily view such a fact
pattern as falling within Loretto, and might feel compelled to allow
the owner to use the takings clause as an end run around the regula-
tory scheme. Thus, the continued viability of the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning poses a subtle but real threat to the success of future regula-
tory schemes. The Supreme Court should have eagerly seized the
opportunity to address and resolve the issue.
D. A Principled Application of the Loretto Per Se Rule
Per se rules are designed to encourage efficiency, but they are not
invoked until the underlying conduct, examined in light of the
guiding principle of law which governs it, is found to be so egre-
gious as to render future consideration of particular instances of
that conduct unnecessary to a determination that these principles
have been violated.
1 43
The Loretto Court established a per se rule in the takings context. In
the Court's view, a permanent physical invasion of property necessar-
ily deprives a property owner of his "bundle of property rights."
144
This "bundle" encompasses the right to "possess, use, and dispose" of
one's property.1 41 One of the most precious strands in this bundle is
the right to exclude.146 The Court also stressed that occupation by a
stranger was a particularly severe form of invasion because it added
insult to the owner's injury.
147
Assuming that the FCC would prevent Florida Power from
excluding the cable companies in retaliation, such action would "tech-
nically" trigger the Loretto rule. An analysis of the circumstances
underlying this dispute, however, demonstrates that most of the con-
cerns underlying the Loretto decision are inapposite. The utility com-
panies have the right to "possess" the space occupied by the cable
operators if they need it.1 4I The utility does not relinquish all property
143. Costonis, supra note 24, at 535.
144. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36; see supra note 58.
145. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945)).
146. Id. at 436; see supra note 34.
147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
148. Florida Power's agreement with each cable operator made clear that it granted the
operator access only to surplus space on each pole, and that if Florida Power needed the space
for its own operations, it might reclaim it. The agreement required Florida Power to give
notice before removing cable facilities. See 47 C.F.R. 1.1403(a) (1986) (requires utilities to
give notice to cable operators prior to removal or termination of service). Such pole-by-pole
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rights in the space occupied by the cable operators. 149 The companies
may also "use" the space inasmuch as they may receive a reasonable
rate of return for the rental of space for which they have no other
use. 150 Moreover, the utilities have the right to remove their poles
from the telecommunications market and thereby retain power to free
themselves from regulation.15" ' More importantly, the severity of the
type of invasion in Loretto, that of a stranger occupying the space, did
not occur in Florida Power. Loretto stressed that the severity of an
occupation by a stranger stemmed from the owner's lack of control
over the timing, extent, and nature of the invasion.'52 In the instant
case, Florida Power had contracted with the cable operators for the
occupation of the space on its poles subject to negotiated conditions
and terms. The only limitation FCC placed on the utility's use of its
property is that the utility may not impose unreasonable terms or con-
ditions upon its tenant. In substance, all Florida Power is giving up is
the right to obtain monopolistic profits as a result of its superior bar-
gaining position.
Nevertheless, a court applying the Loretto per se rule cannot con-
sider these factors. As this case illustrates, despite the administrative
convenience of per se rules, upon application, they often yield
unsound results.'53 Justice Blackmun's dissent in Loretto correctly
displacements are less likely to be retaliatory than decisions to terminate economically
beneficial agreements in their entirety. If Florida Power needed to use the surplus space on its
poles, its motivation for excluding the cable operator is less likely to be characterized as
retaliatory. Brief for Appellants at 19 n.24, FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107
(1987) (No. 85-1660).
149. The property owner in Loretto did not have any kind of property right in the space
occupied by the installation. Loretto could reclaim the space occupied by the cable company
only if she withdrew her unit from the rental market.
150. The FCC permits the utility companies to charge a reasonable rate for their rental
space. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The regulation in Loretto limited the
landlord to a one time, one dollar fee for the use of her space.
151. The FCC only has jurisdiction over the utilities as long as they assign communication
space on their poles. See supra note 134.
152. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437.
153. This would be the practical effect of applying the per se rule of Loretto. See text
accompanying notes 144-52. Despite the fact that the FCC substantially lowered the rental fee
the utility was charging, Florida Power would have a difficult time arguing that the rate finally
imposed was confiscatory. See Florida Power, 107 S. Ct. at 1113 (rate allowed by the Pole
Attachments Act permitted recovery of allocated and capital costs); Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, the Court held that
regulation may, "consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return recovered on
investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional
calculus of reasonableness." Id. at 769. Moreover, under the Penn Central test, Florida Power
would not be able to assert successfully a takings claim. In Penn Central, the Court suggested
that as long as the property owner could get a "reasonable rate of return" on his investment,
and the regulation did not interfere with his primary expectations, the regulation did not effect
a taking. In Florida Power, the utility company did not allege that the regulation was
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pointed out that by "directing that all 'permanent physical occupa-
tions' automatically are compensable, 'without regard to whether the
action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner'. . . the Court does not further equity so
much as it encourages litigants to manipulate their factual allegations
to gain the benefit of the per se rule."' 54
To apply the Loretto per se rule to these facts is to ignore the
main purpose of the takings clause-to bar the government from forc-
ing individuals alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, the public as a whole should bear.' The clause prohibits the
state from exercising the police power in an arbitrary manner'56 or in
a way so deleterious to an individual's property right as to amount to
an appropriation or confiscation. 57  The framers could not have
intended for the takings clause to provide a property owner with a
bad faith defense to a valid and necessary regulation.
E. The Prevention of Retaliatory Exclusions Should Not Trigger
the Loretto Per Se Rule
In order for the Pole Attachments Act to operate effectively, the
FCC must be empowered to issue stays preventing a utility from
excluding the cable companies when the actions of the utility are
aimed at undermining the success of the regulatory scheme.158
Although an FCC order enjoining the utility companies from exclud-
ing the cable operators could technically trigger the Loretto per se
rule, a court should nevertheless dismiss a takings claim where
it makes a preliminary finding that the party asserting the claim is
acting in bad faith. A utility would be acting in bad faith when its
decision to exclude a cable operator is directly related to the cable
operator's invocation of the FCC's jurisdiction and protection.
depriving it of a reasonable rate of return. Moreover, the regulation did not interfere with
Florida Power's primary expectation as to the use of its surplus pole space, namely the ability
to rent pole space. Therefore, the regulation could amount to a taking only if applied
"arbitrarily or unreasonably." See supra note 35.
154. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 451.
155. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
156. See supra note 35.
157. See supra notes 34-93 and accompanying text.
158. Effective implementation and enforcement of the Pole Attachments Act is totally
dependent on the private initiative of cable operators who object to oppressive rates.
Permitting the utility companies to evict cable operators in retaliation would have a chilling
effect on the assertion of rights protected by the Act. Cf. Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp.,
463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (An eviction grounded on a desire to punish a tenant's exercise
of his right to assert substantial violations of the housing code is impermissible.); Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968) (same).
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Courts should not permit such retaliatory action by a utility
company.
A court should presume an eviction to be retaliatory 59 when it
follows a cable operator's successful invocation of the FCC's juris-
diction. The utility company would then have to show that the
underlying motive for the exclusion was not retaliatory. This burden,
whether of proof or of production, ought to fall on the utility com-
pany because they alone have access to information regarding the rea-
sons for the exclusion. The court should hear the takings claim only
after the utility company proves the absence of retaliatory motivation
or the existence of a legitimate reason for excluding the cable
operators.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in FCC v. Florida Power had an excellent
opportunity to place the Loretto rule in its proper perspective and to
provide guidelines as to its proper application. The case presented a
highly complicated and very real question: if the FCC stays a utility's
attempt to exclude a cable operator who invoked FCC economic regu-
lation of their pole attachment agreement, does the issuance of such a
stay constitute an unconstitutional taking of the utility's property
under the Loretto rule? The Supreme Court specifically chose not to
address this issue and instead, held that, on its face, the Pole Attach-
ments Act did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of Florida
Power's property. The Court thus resolved the issue by answering a
question that no one had asked.
Although the Supreme Court did not answer the real question
posed in Florida Power, it ought to have done so in the negative. In
Loretto, the Supreme Court stated that the rule of that case should be
applied only in a very narrow manner. In theory, the rule should only
inhere when the government authorizes an uninvited permanent
physical invasion onto private property. The critical and obvious dis-
159. The Court should attach the same presumption of retaliatory eviction employed by
courts in the landlord/tenant context. See Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853,
865 (D.C. Cir. 1972). According to Robinson, the fact finder must first determine the
landlord's motivation for evicting the tenant. That motivation may be inferred from the
landlord's objective manifestations. If the landlord's actions are motivated by a desire to
punish the tenant for exercising his rights, or a desire to chill the exercise of similar rights by
other tenants, then his actions are impermissible. An unexplained eviction following
successful assertion of a tenant's rights is presumed to be retaliatory. Once the court
determines the existence of this presumption, the landlord may rebut the presumption by
showing some legitimate business purpose. If the landlord is unable to rebut this presumption,
then the court will assume that his motives for eviction are illicit and deny him the right to
evict.
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tinction between Loretto and Florida Power is that in the former, the
owner had in no way invited the physical invasion of the cable opera-
tor. It was the invasion of a property owner's dominion interest that
was critical to the genesis of the Loretto rule. Florida Power, on the
other hand, poses an entirely different scenario. Once Florida Power
willingly solicited the cable operators' occupation of its poles, it could
no longer validly claim that the subsequent FCC economic regulation
infringed upon its dominion interests. Because the distinction
between the two cases is so critical, the Supreme Court should have
limited the Loretto rule as inhering only when the permanent physical
invasion is unsolicited.
Moreover, Florida Power should not be permitted to invoke the
Loretto rule in order to protect its economic interest from FCC impo-
sition of confiscatory rates. The Supreme Court has established tradi-
tional takings analyses to determine the constitutionality of price and
rate regulation. Those are the proper channels by which Florida
Power should have asserted its takings claim. Florida Power was not
legitimately entitled to assert a Loretto physical invasion claim when
it is clear that only its economic interests, as opposed to its dominion
interests, were the basis for the claim.
There is another equally compelling reason for not permitting a
utility to invoke the Loretto rule in the event that the FCC issues a
stay in response to a retaliatory exclusion. Unless the FCC is able to
issue retaliatory stays preventing utility companies from excluding
cable operators after successful invocations of FCC regulation, the
resulting exclusions would not only serve as a wrongful punishment
to cable operators for exercising valid rights, but they would also
serve as a warning to other cable operators not to exercise the same
rights. Because the effective implementation of the Pole Attachments
Act depends entirely on the cable operators' assertion of their own
rights, retaliatory action by the utilities would have a chilling effect on
the assertion of such rights and consequently would frustrate the pub-
lic objectives of the Act. If the Court had determined that under
these circumstances, an FCC stay would nevertheless trigger the
application of the Loretto rule, the Court, in essence, would have
sanctioned the utilities' use of strong arm tactics to blackmail cable
operators into silence and submission.
A court has a duty to effect the will of Congress just as it has the
responsibility to consider the social context upon which its decisions
will impact. A court should not allow a per se rule to legitimize
unfair and illegitimate business practices aimed at undermining the
intent of Congress in enacting valid remedial legislation.
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In a very real sense, Florida Power's monopolistic overcharging
smacks of blackmail. The utility companies received public land upon
which to build their poles, and thus arrived at their present monopo-
listic status, under the assumption that the companies existed to serve
the public. Congress saw fit to limit the degree to which the utilities
could take advantage of their lucrative position by holding the cable
operators hostage for exorbitant ransoms ultimately to be borne by
the public. By asserting the takings clause as an end run to a legiti-
mate and necessary legislative goal, the utilities once again attempt to
make the public bear the cost of their monopolistic greed. The issue
was and remains: will the Court make the Loretto rule the vehicle for
the satisfaction of the utilities' own greed?
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